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1THE FRONTSTAGE AND BACKSTAGE OF CORPORATE SUSTAINABILITY
REPORTING: EVIDENCE FROM THE ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE
REFUGE BILL
ABSTRACT
While proponents of sustainability reporting believe in its potential to help corporations
be accountable and transparent about their social and environmental impacts, there has
been growing criticism asserting that such reporting schemes are utilized primarily as
impression management tools. Drawing on Erving Goffman’s (1959) self-presentation
theory and its frontstage/backstage analogy, we contrast the frontstage sustainability
discourse of a sample of large U.S. oil and gas firms to their backstage corporate political
activities in the context of the passage of the American-Made Energy and Good Jobs Act,
also known as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) Bill. The ANWR Bill was
designed to allow oil exploration within the most sensitive environmental areas in the
Refuge and this bill was vigorously debated in the United States Congress in 2005 and
2006. Our results suggest that the firms’ sustainability discourse on environmental
stewardship and responsibility contrasts sharply with their less visible but proactive
political strategies targeted to facilitate the passage of the ANWR Bill. This study thus
contributes to the social and environmental accounting and accountability literature by
highlighting the relevance of Goffman’s frontstage/backstage analogy in uncovering and
documenting further the deceptive nature of the discourse contained in stand-alone
sustainability reports. In addition, it seeks to contribute to the overall understanding of
the multifaceted nature of sustainability reporting by placing it in relation to corporate
political activities.
Keywords: backstage and frontstage; Goffman; impression management; lobbying and
political strategies; self-presentation; sustainability reporting.
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REPORTING: EVIDENCE FROM THE ARCTIC NATIONAL WILDLIFE
REFUGE BILL
1. Introduction
The recent explosion of corporate sustainability reporting is primarily driven by
increasing stakeholder concerns and pressures on organizations (Gray et al., 2014). It has
been suggested that sustainability reporting provides substantive information to corporate
share- and stakeholders (see Rost and Ehrmann, forthcoming), thereby having the
potential to improve transparency and aid stakeholders in their attempts to make sense of
corporate social and environmental impacts (Bebbington et al., 2014). Significant
criticism also exists, arguing that these disclosures tend to be selective and biased (Aras
and Crowther, 2008; Boiral, 2016; Milne and Gray, 2013; Milne et al., 2009), and, thus,
do not enhance corporate accountability (Michelon et al., 2015). These disagreements in
perspective can be explained partially by the lack of sustainability reporting regulation
(Merkl-Davies and Brennan, 2007). Flexibility in reporting enables corporate managers
to select the specific pieces of information they want to disclose (Adams, 2004; Boiral,
2013; but see also Unerman and Zappettini, 2014), increasing the potential for
corporations to engage in impression management (Criado-Jiménez et al., 2008; Merkl-
Davis and Brennan, 2007; 2011).
Prior studies have investigated potential reasons why corporations engage in
sustainability reporting while others do not, as well as the purview and accuracy of report
content (e.g., Bozzolan et al., 2015; Clarkson et al., 2008; Dhaliwal et al., 2012; Patten,
1992). Most of these studies were conducted either as event case studies or by examining
3the relation between environmental performance and environmental disclosure, and used
qualitative or quantitative methods.
The purpose of this study is to advance our understanding of corporate
sustainability by combining both a qualitative and quantitative method of analysis to
study the congruence (or lack of congruence) between the content of a corporation’s
sustainability report and its related political activities. Specifically using Goffman’s
(1959) self-presentation theory – particularly its frontstage/backstage analogy – and a
combination of different research analysis methods, we seek to contrast the frontstage
sustainability discourse of a sample of large U.S. oil and gas firms with their backstage
corporate political activities in the context of the passage of the American-Made Energy
and Good Jobs Act, also known as the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) Bill.
The ANWR Bill was a piece of legislation that corporate interests argued would have
favored business activities and enhanced the economy since it would have created new
jobs by opening up areas of the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge to hydrocarbon
exploration. Environmentalist and many in the Alaskan indigenous community argued,
on the other hand, that the ANWR Bill would do irreparable harm to their native land and
way of life. Responding to recent calls to employ original theoretical lenses and to move
away from predominant theories used in social and environmental accounting research
(Bebbington and Thomson, 2013; Cho et al., 2015; Unerman and Chapman, 2014), we
use ANWR as a setting to illustrate the relevance of the frontstage and backstage
concepts for developing our empirical and theoretical understanding of corporate
sustainability management and disclosures.
4We qualitatively analyze available stand-alone sustainability report disclosures
provided by our sample firms during the 2004-2006 period that is most relevant to the
ANWR Bill, and contrast the content of these disclosures with their corresponding
corporate lobbying activities using a quantitative political action committee empirical
model. As explained in detail later in the paper, our analyses focus on this discrete period
for three primary reasons. First, the 2004-2006 period represents the most intense and
contentious time period in which the major oil corporations pushed the U.S. Congress to
pass legislation to allow drilling in ANWR. Second, the corporate lobbying and political
action committee activity during this time period coincides with Congressional voting on
a bill that would have allowed drilling and provides us an opportunity to empirically
model the association between oil corporations’ Congressional campaign support and
legislator voting. Third, oil exploration activities are very expensive relative to other U.S
domestic drilling efforts. Oil prices were at historic highs during this time period and
provided more substantive economic arguments for allowing drilling in ANWR. Our
post-2006 analysis confirms that, while political debates continue regarding the potential
environmental damage associated with oil exploration undertaken in environmentally
sensitive areas, the level of debate over drilling in ANWR subsided significantly when
the ANWR Bill failed to become law.
Through our analysis we find that the firms’ sustainability discourse on the
importance of environmental stewardship and responsibility contrasts sharply with their
less visible but deliberate and proactive political actions targeted to facilitate the passage
of the ANWR Bill. Such disconnection is even more flagrant given that one specific
disclosure theme revolves around biodiversity protection and conservation—a critical
5issue for the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge. Our study thus makes a contribution to the
social and environmental accounting and accountability literature by taking prior research
on sustainability reporting beyond the previously documented legitimacy and impression
management strategy framework (see, e.g., Bansal and Kistruck, 2006; Beelitz and
Merkl-Davies, 2012; Deegan, 2014; Du and Vieira, 2012; Merkl-Davies and Brennan,
2007; Neu et al., 1998; Patten, 1992; van Halderen et al., 2016).  Using the frontstage and
backstage Goffmanesque concepts, we uncover and document further the misleading
nature of the discourse contained in stand-alone sustainability reports. Prior research has
repetitively shown how sustainability reporting provided by corporations is inconsistent
with their sustainability performance (Adams, 2004; Boiral, 2013; Patten, 2002), a
finding which we further extend here by discussing the inconsistencies between publicly
visible corporate reporting and their less visible political activities.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section provides the
theoretical development. Section 3 describes the empirical setting, including how
corporate political strategies and sustainability reporting can be tied to backstage and
frontstage, respectively. Sections 4 and 5 present the methods and findings for both the
qualitative frontstage analysis and the quantitative backstage analysis. Conclusions,
limitations, and future research opportunities are discussed in Section 6.
2. Theoretical development
Our theoretical framework is based on Erving Goffman’s theory of self-
presentation (Goffman, 1959). Goffman uses a dramaturgical analysis, or theatrical
metaphor, to explain how individuals attempt to manage the impressions others form
6about themselves. He maintains that individuals consciously assume roles to create
impressions in the minds of others. Indeed, in the course of a social interaction,
individuals accomplish performances like actors impersonate characters on stage. The
purpose of the performance is to convey information to the others – termed the audience
– in order to orient and control the impressions the audience will develop about the
performer. As such, communication in all its forms is fundamental to Goffman’s
conception of impression management: “[Impression management] is achieved largely by
influencing the definition of the situation which the others come to formulate and he [the
individual] can influence this definition by expressing himself in such a way as to give
them the kind of impression that will lead them to act voluntarily in accordance with his
own plan” (Goffman, 1959, p. 3-4, emphasis added). Simply put, individuals accomplish
this performance in order to lead the audience to perceive them as favorably as possible.
To do so, performers pay significant attention to the information they communicate
emphasizing some elements while underplaying others (Goffman, 1959).
According to Goffman, region occupies a central role in dramaturgical analysis
and can be divided into frontstage (“on the scene”) and backstage (“behind the scene”).
Both regions are defined in relation to the position of the audience targeted by the
performance. At the frontstage, individuals perform before the audience. The frontstage is
where individuals present their official stance. They want the audience to perceive them a
certain way and will develop and adjust their front performance in order to achieve this
objective (see Jeacle, 2014).  To this end, they will over-communicate some information
and under-communicate other while seeking to demonstrate how their activities maintain
7certain standards and are aligned with social expectations (Goffman, 1959; Collinson,
1999).
Backstage, the performers are present but the audience is not allowed. This is
where the performers prepare their frontstage performance and decide what information
to put forward or leave behind during the actual show or play. Since the audience is not
allowed backstage, this also is where the individuals can relax and “step out of
character”; that is, stop playing their act, without the risk of destroying the impressions
they managed to construct in the audience (see Jeacle, 2014). Elements of information
suppressed or downplayed in the frontstage appear in the backstage context.  In other
words, the secrets of the show are kept backstage. Keeping secrets is essential to the
protection of the impressions the performers want to generate in the audience. If they
were to be known, secrets would discredit both the performance and the performers
(Goffman, 1959).
Although Goffman’s work moves primarily on the level of the individual (see
Leary and Kowalski, 1990), we maintain here that like those of individuals, corporate
attempts to manage public impressions about their activities through communication can
be analyzed using the theatrical metaphor (Allen and Caillouet, 1994; McCormick 2007;
Young and Massey, 1978). Allen and Caillouet (1994, p. 46), drawing on Goffman
(1959), maintain that “organizations, like individuals, are ´actors` engaging in
´performances` in various ´settings` before ´audiences`”. This relates closely to the
question of how we understand the organizational self and its identity, and whether we
should treat corporate reports and communication as produced by some individuals
within the organization or by the organization itself (see Cheney, 1992). As pointed out
8by Tregidga and colleagues (2014, p. 480), there is in the organizational communication
literature a long tradition to consider organizational texts as “representations of
organizations, and as a process of identification”. In exploring how corporations come to
represent themselves as sustainable organizations, Tregidga and colleagues (2014) argue
that despite the fact that all corporate communication is produced by individuals or
groups of individuals, such organizational texts “represent the organization and play a
role in constructing organizational identity” (p. 480).
Along similar lines, White and Hanson (2002) analyze a long-standing debate
regarding how ideas such as corporate identity and corporate image should be treated. In
their analysis, White and Hanson (2002, p. 290) point out that in Goffman’s work his
discussion of the ´self` is not restricted to the individual level and that he would perceive
“the ´self` as far more than an embodied individual”. Thus, White and Hanson (2002)
argue that a Goffmanesque analysis can be extended from the individual to a collective
level, and thereby maintain that a corporation can be considered as a ´self` in an analysis
evoking Goffman’s theatrical metaphors. Moreover, Tregidga and Milne (2006, p. 220)
draw on Cheney (1992) and highlight how in the literature it is argued that organizations
increasingly “are what they communicate”.
Given the above and in line with Tregidga and colleagues (2014; see also Laine,
2010), we maintain here that how organizations represent themselves – and construct
their discursive identities – in their communication has tangible implications on how their
voice and actions are perceived in society. Not surprisingly, organizations have been
noted to actively use communication in seeking to manage the impression their relevant
audiences have of them (see Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Cheney, 1992).
9Accordingly, prior research has employed Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphors to
investigate corporate annual reports and other communication. White and Hanson (2002)
show how a multinational corporation uses some of Goffman’s impression management
techniques in its annual report disclosure to build its corporate reputation. Previously, the
work of Neu et al. (1998), illustrating how corporations use environmental disclosure in
annual reports to manage public impression about their activities, is inspired by Goffman
(1959). Jeacle (2008) studies the big four accounting firms’ recruitment literature in light
of Goffman’s theory to illustrate how these firms manage impressions with the goal of
counteracting the boring accountant stereotype and facilitate recruitment.  In more direct
connection to the study presented in this paper, Cho and Roberts (2010) situate
Goffman’s sociological theory of self-presentation within the organizational legitimacy
framework and demonstrate how the content and presentational features of corporate
websites are employed by corporations operating in environmentally sensitive industries
to manage impressions about their environmental performance. Relatedly, Solomon and
colleagues (2013) recently discuss how in corporate private environmental reporting
“both investors and investees employ Goffmanesque, staged impression management as a
means of creating and disseminating a dual myth of social and environmental
accountability” (p. 195). They highlight that while “ritualistic impression management”
in regard to sustainability information takes place in the frontstage, in the backstage
financial reporting is prioritized in the financial investment institutions. Although
Solomon and colleagues (2013) focus on private disclosures instead of publicly available
corporate sustainability reports, their insights highlight the need for further explorations
that contrast corporate frontstage disclosures with their more covert backstage activities.1
1 Organizations have a range of stakeholders with different expectations and of varying power (e.g.
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Besides the work drawing on Goffman, there is a substantial body of research
exploring corporate disclosures from various other impression management perspectives
specifically in the oil and gas industry (e.g., Abdelrehim et al., 2015; Arena et al., 2015;
Bell and Lundblad, 2011; Cho, 2009; Hooghiemstra, 2000; Du and Vieira, 2012; Matejek
and Gössling, 2014; Michelon, 2012; Patten, 1992; van Halderen et al., 2016), in the
water industry (e.g., Cooper and Slack, 2015; Ogden and Clarke, 2005) and in other
settings (e.g., Bansal and Clelland, 2004; Boiral, 2016; Bozzolan et al., 2015; Brennan et
al., 2013; Elsbach and Sutton, 1992; Higgins and Walker, 2012; Michelon et al., 2015;
Neu et al., 1998; Sandberg and Holmlund, 2015; Talbot and Boiral, 2015;  Talbot and
Boiral, forthcoming; Tata and Prasad, 2015; Windsheid et al., 2016). In general, this prior
research has shown how organizations use different impression management tactics to
maintain or enhance their image (e.g. Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990; Beelitz and Merkl-
Davies, 2012). Within the impression management literature, the key point is that with
the various communication strategies organizations alter and fine-tune their disclosures in
such a way that the relevant publics would form a positive (or at least neutral) view of the
organization (see Bozzolan et al., 2015). It has also been argued that in some cases
organizations engage in attempts to manipulate public perceptions in seeking to maintain
their legitimacy in society (Cho, 2009; Ylönen & Laine, 2015). Recently, Merkl-Davies,
Brennan and colleagues have produced a series of papers (Merkl-Davies & Brennan,
2007; 2011; Merkl-Davies et al., 2011; Brennan & Merkl-Davies, 2013), in which they
Mitchell et al., 1997; Arenas et al., 2009). As pointed out by Goffman (1959), the context and setting will
define what kind of an impression an actor seeks to convey, and to which audience. Therefore, we could
expect to see attempts of creating and managing impressions differently in respect to each group of
stakeholders (see also Bozzolan et al., 2015; Cho et al., 2015). As the purpose of this paper is to illustrate
the usefulness of Goffman’s frontstage/backstage analogy to corporate sustainability reporting research on
a more general level, we maintain that an analysis of the interactions in regard to particular subsets of
stakeholder audiences is beyond the scope of this paper.
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have – through an extensive review of prior literature –produced a detailed framework for
distinguishing and analyzing the various impression management tactics that
organizations engage in when interacting with their stakeholders. We acknowledge that
this work has provided us substantial insights into how the organizations use their
disclosures in attempts to convey favorable representations of them.
Simultaneously, however, we note that many contributions within this body of
research focus merely on corporate communication (e.g. Merkl-Davies and Brennan,
2011), and do not necessary engage directly with the discrepancy between a corporation’s
disclosures and its actions. We posit that Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphors provide
illustrative vocabulary, which helps shed light on how corporations on the one hand make
some aspects visible and prominent while on the other work to obfuscate or hide some
other elements. Indeed, as noted by Milne and Patten (2002, p.375), organizations can
seek “to conceal the ´back stage` activities from prying eyes”. We maintain that
Goffman’s frontstage and backstage as well as his other conceptual tools within the
dramaturgical framework are illuminating metaphors, and as such serve in further
enhancing our understanding of the potential discrepancies between corporate talk and
action, alongside other conceptualizations such as symbolic and substantive
representation (Ashforth and Gibbs, 1990).
The use of Goffman’s dramaturgical metaphors aids in broadening the theoretical
and conceptual basis of corporate sustainability reporting research. A broad range of
theories may be employed to study sustainability accounting issues (Gray et al. 2009).
One of the most prevailing theories in sustainability accounting research is legitimacy
theory (see e.g., Beelitz and Merkl-Davies, 2012; Deegan, 2014; Patten, 1992), which has
12
however recently been under criticism for the lack of refinement of the approach and the
simplistic assumptions it is based on (Deegan, 2014) as well as the limited scope of the
theory (Spence et al., 2010).
Finally, it has also been pointed out (Unerman and Chapman, 2014) that the
repeated use of a single theory may lead to the production of marginal contributions
instead of creating compelling advances to knowledge. Accordingly, and despite
acknowledging that our empirical setting could also be approached through concepts of
organizational legitimacy, we opted for a less frequently used theoretical lens and thereby
answer the repeated calls to employ original theoretical perspectives as an attempt to
enrich the understanding of sustainability accounting and reporting (Bebbington and
Thomson, 2013; Unerman and Chapman, 2014), as we maintain that Goffman’s
dramaturgical metaphor is employed only seldom in accounting research (aside from the
articles we list above).
In summary, we will draw on Goffman’s framework to analyze corporate
activities and to further refine our understanding of corporate sustainability disclosures.
More specifically, we argue that corporate activities can be divided into frontstage and
backstage performance. Frontstage activities are externally oriented activities aiming to
manage relationships with stakeholders in order to repair or maintain legitimacy, while
backstage activities are internally oriented management activities aiming to foster
corporate interests away from those same stakeholders’ scrutiny. In the context of our
study, we consider voluntary sustainability reporting in stand-alone reports as the
frontstage corporate activities whereas corporate political strategies such as political
13
campaign contributions are envisioned as backstage corporate activities, with the passage
of the ANWR Bill constituting the empirical setting that generates potential conflict.
3. Empirical setting
3.1. The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge and the American-Made Energy and Good Jobs
Act
The Arctic National Wildlife Refuge (ANWR) is located in Northern Alaska and
covers about 19.8 million acres (80,000 km2) of the North Alaskan coast (Burger, 2001).
It is managed by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and constitutes the largest single
protected wilderness area in the U.S. (League of Conservation Voters, 2005). The ANWR
was first declared a federal protected area by Frederick Andrew Seaton under President
Eisenhower’s administration in 1960 before being further secured and backed by the
Alaska National Interest Lands Conservation Act of 1980 (U.S. 96th Congress, 2009).
One part of this legislation – section 1002 – postponed an important decision regarding
future management of a designated 1.5 million acres (6,100 km²) coastal plain region
referred as the “1002 area” because of its alleged large supply of crude oil and natural
resources. Hence, because Congressional authorization was required before any activities
could take place in the “1002 area”, the question of whether to drill for oil in the ANWR
has been used as a political device and subject to much debate and controversy in
national media and U.S. politics since 1977 – even before the 1980 Act was passed
(Waller, 2001; Shogren, 2005).2
2 Such debate and controversy include the Canadian and US governments signing the “Agreement on the
Conservation of the Porcupine Caribou Herd” (July 1987) aimed at protecting the species from damage to
its habitat and migration routes; a bill allowing drilling that was stopped when the Exxon Valdez oil spill
happened (March/April 1989); another legislation allowing drilling voted by the Republican-majority
House and Senate but vetoed by President Clinton (1996); a controversy about reports issued by the U.S
Geological Survey about the quantities and location of oil (1987 and 1998); and a series of votes about the
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Drilling opponents argue that oil exploration activities would significantly harm
the natural wildlife. They also base their arguments on the U.S. Department of Energy
reports on the uncertainty of the underlying resource base in the ANWR and its projected
effects on oil price and supplies (U.S. Department of Energy, 2008). On the other hand,
multinational oil companies, supported by most Alaskan officials, have been constantly
lobbying federal legislators for Congressional authorization to drill in the refuge’s
sensitive coastal plain area, claiming that new domestic oil production would (1) help
businesses expand by creating jobs, (2) contribute to economic growth, (3) make the U.S.
less dependent on foreign energy sources and, (4) affect less than 1 percent of the coastal
plain (Arctic Circle, 2009).  Hence, the protection of Alaska’s Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge remains among the highest priorities for the U.S. environmental community.
In March 2005, the ANWR was exposed to significant political debate. Drilling
proponents in the U.S. Senate (hereafter, “Senate”) managed to include Arctic Refuge
drilling provisions in the federal budget process, hence avoiding a Democratic-led
filibuster. While the Senate had narrowly passed its budget reconciliation bill calling for
Arctic drilling language (Center for Responsive Politics, 2005), a bipartisan coalition in
the 109th U.S. Congress House of Representatives (hereafter, “House”) with pro-
conservation Republicans and Democrats was able to force the removal of the drilling
language, along with offshore drilling provisions, in the final reconciliation bill.3  The
status of the ANWR in the House of Representative and the Senate ranging from pushing, approving and
rejecting bills that allowed drilling.
3 After failing to include Arctic Refuge drilling in the final budget reconciliation bill, Senator Stevens (R-
AK) made a last attempt to include language in the Defense Appropriations conference report. This attempt
drew bipartisan opposition and the Arctic drilling language was ultimately abandoned (League of
Conservation Voters, 2005).
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revised conference report was then approved by both chambers, keeping the ANWR safe
from drilling (League of Conservation Voters, 2005).
ANWR was subject to another turbulent political year in 2006. House leaders
again attempted to advance their ANWR drilling agenda—Richard Pombo (R-CA), Chair
of the House Committee on Natural Resources (hereafter, “House Resources
Committee”) sponsored the American-Made Energy and Good Jobs Act, also known as
stand-alone House Bill H.R. 5429 or under its popular name, the “Arctic National
Wildlife Refuge Bill” (hereafter, “ANWR Bill”). While the ANWR Bill included some
special provisions (in Section 3(e) and (f)) that would limit or exclude oil exploration in
some special or closed areas, its overall primary purpose was to “direct the Secretary of
the Interior to establish and implement a competitive oil and gas leasing program that will
result in an environmentally sound program for the exploration, development, and
production of the oil and gas resources of the Coastal Plain of Alaska, and for other
purposes” (THOMAS, 2009). House Bill H.R. 5429 was introduced to the House on May
19, 2006 and passed on May 25 by a 225-201 vote4 (U.S. House of Representatives,
2009). However, pro-conservation House Republicans once again stood with Democrats
to ensure that Arctic drilling was not included in the House budget resolution. As the two
bills were never reconciled, the ANWR remains protected to date (League of
Conservation Voters, 2006; Corn et al., 2015).
A timeline for both the key events related to the ANWR and the American-Made
Energy and Good Jobs Act (H.R. 5429) is depicted in Appendix A. The top half of the
appendix provides a timeline of the key events in the ANWR drilling debate. The bottom
half of the appendix provides a timeline for H.R. 5429. The timeline for the ANWR
4 This was done through House roll-call vote 209.
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drilling debate shows that ANWR has received political attention before and after the
time period associated with H.R. 5429.  However, the 2004-2006 timeframe represents
the most critical time of debate and the most active period of concentrated corporate
political activity that can be traced directly to ANWR.
Several facts related to the ANWR corporate political activities and related
sustainability reporting support our focus on the 2004-2006 time period and on the debate
over H.R. 5429. First, the 2004-2006 time period coincides with Congressional voting on
a bill that would have allowed drilling and provides us an opportunity to empirically
model the association between oil corporations’ Congressional campaign support and
legislator voting. Although legislative activities occurred after 2006 they never reached
the same level of importance (Corn et al., 2015). Second, oil exploration activities are
very expensive relative to other U.S domestic drilling efforts. Oil prices were at historic
highs during this time period and provided more substantive economic arguments for
allowing drilling in ANWR. Thus, the economic arguments for drilling in ANWR were
strongest. Corn et al. (2015) report that the oil drilling costs per foot in Alaska as opposed
to drilling in the lower 48 states, were 6.4 times higher in 2005, 18 times higher in 2009,
and 31 times higher in 2011.
Although the price of oil fluctuated significantly between 2005 and 2016,
corporations’ interests in drilling in ANWR seemed to drop significantly after 2006. Both
Chevron and Marathon eventually withdrew operations from Alaska after 2006.
ExxonMobil mentioned ANWR drilling only once after 2006, reporting in 2012 only that
it had discussed ANWR with shareholders. Two of the corporations seemed to shift
drilling interest to other parts of Alaska. ExxonMobil expanded exploration into Point
17
Thompson and ConocoPhillips is interested in an area known as “The Greater Moose’s
Tooth Project.” Our post-2006 analysis confirms that, while political debates continue
regarding the potential environmental damage associated with oil exploration undertaken
in environmentally sensitive areas, the level of debate over drilling in ANWR subsided
significantly when the ANWR Bill failed to become law in 2006. Given its political and
environmental ramifications, ANWR provides a relevant setting in which to apply
Goffman’s frontstage-backstage analogy to sustainability management and disclosure
during the time period covering H.R. 5429 (Podesta and Boots 2015; Stolberg 2008; U.S.
Department of Interior 2015).
3.2. Political action committees
Oil and gas corporations play an active role in the U.S. political scene. The
industry has contributed over $251.6 million since 1989 to federal candidates and
political parties of which 77% were allocated to Republicans (Center for Responsive
Politics, 2005, 2016). In particular, PACs5 from the Energy and Natural Resources sector
had already outnumbered those from other industries throughout the mid-1980s and
consistently ranked among the highest political campaign contributors (Center for
Responsive Politics, 2010; Eismeier and Pollock, 1988). And, while corporate PACs
contributed over $200 million to congressional candidates during the 2006 election cycle,
5 Corporate PACs are “political committees established and administered by corporations, labor unions,
membership organizations or trade associations” and “can only solicit contributions from individuals
associated with connected or sponsoring organization” (Federal Election Commission, 2010). They result
from the Federal Election Campaign Act of 1971 (FECA) and its subsequent amendments in 1974, 1976
and 1979 (Cho, 2007). According to Smith (2000), the key commodity bestowed upon PACs is access; this
means that “during deliberations leading to relevant legislative decisions, corporate political action
committees (PACs) […] get a respectful hearing from House and Senate members who have won election
with the PAC’s help” and that “corporations giving PAC contributions frequently receive ‘face time’ from
members […] and gain a valuable opportunity to present their perspectives” (p. 119). For more details on
PACs, see Cho et al. (2006); Cho et al. (2008); Roberts et al. (2003); and Thornburg and Roberts (2008).
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the Energy and Natural Resources sector alone donated over $22 million in PAC
contributions during that same cycle (Center for Responsive Politics, 2010). More
specifically, Cho et al. (2008) show how a sample of firms in the chemical and petroleum
industries directed their PAC funds towards legislators deemed influential in a
controversial piece of legislation that was passed in the U.S. immediately after the
Bhopal disaster of 1984. The results of Cho et al. (2008) suggest that these industries
sought to use their PACs in order to subvert legislation increasing corporate
accountability on environmental pollution issues.
While PAC contributions are publicly available from the Centre for Responsive
Politics’ website (http://www.opensecrets.org) and other public sources, it is challenging
to identify, compile, and analyze such information in a meaningful way. For example, the
Center for Responsive Politics’ website provides contribution amounts by each PAC
given to federal candidates but not the total aggregate amount of PAC contributions
received by a specific candidate (nor from which PAC those contributions come from).
The challenges associated with extracting meaning from raw PAC information are likely
to repel many stakeholders. The relatively contained dissemination of PAC information is
also less likely to gain stakeholder attention in comparison to the easily accessible and
neatly compiled sustainability reports. From an organizational perspective, the backstage
region is conceived to be more intimate and only accessible to a closer group of actors in
comparison to the frontstage (Cho and Roberts, 2010).  This leads us to locate political
strategies and contributions on the backstage. The backstage is where corporations can
drop their environmental responsibility discourse, if desired, to foster their business
interests without having to manage impressions (Goffman 1959). In the ANWR context,
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the primary interest of U.S. oil and gas firms is to be granted the rights to exploit the oil
reserves of the wildlife refuge. It is therefore expected that they will design their political
strategies in order to promote those interests.6  We will nonetheless also explore whether
and how political contributions are present in the corporate sustainability disclosures to
provide insights into our frontstage-backstage distinction.
3.3. Sustainability reporting
Because stakeholders are increasingly concerned with corporate environmental
issues (e.g. Bansal and Hoffman, 2012; Cormier et al., 2004; Gray et al., 2014) and
reporting (Rinaldi et al., 2014), sustainability reporting is considered to be on the
frontstage since corporations publish these reports to manage their relationships with
their stakeholders (Mallin et al., 2013; Rodrigue, 2014) as well as their reputation
(Bebbington et al., 2008) and to demonstrate how their activities conform to social
expectations (Bozzolan et al., 2015; Deegan 2014). Specifically, “narrative disclosures in
[corporate] reports allow managers to stage and direct the play they wish the public to
see, to pick the characters, to select the script and to decide which events will be
highlighted and which will be omitted” (Neu et al., 1998, p. 269, paraphrasing Goffman,
1959). Stand-alone sustainability reports are designed to draw public attention to specific
environmental issues selected by the publishing corporation (Gray et al., 2014), and to
construct the image of environmental performance that corporations want the public to
have about themselves (Apostol, 2015; Bansal and Kistruck, 2006; Boiral, 2016).
6 We acknowledge that corporations are not the only party seeking to promote their own interest, as in
environmental issues there is also a range of NGOs and other social actors engaging in political lobbying
(see Doh and Guay, 2006). Some NGOs lobbied for the protection of ANWR. We do not discuss such pro-
environment lobbying here, as our paper focuses on discussing the differences within corporations’
activities in light of Goffman’s theatrical metaphor.
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Corporations have the opportunity to employ these reports to get stakeholder attention
and reap the associated benefits of their described sustainability behavior (Madsen and
Rodgers, 2015). In the ANWR environmental context, frontstage behavior on the part of
oil and gas companies would translate into the use of narratives in their sustainability
reports to emphasize their concerns about environmental protection and performance, in
Alaska or elsewhere. Aware of stakeholders’ environmental concerns and expectations,
companies would report such information to manage stakeholder impressions about their
environmental performance; that is, they would want to appear environmentally
responsible in the eyes of their audience (White and Hanson, 2002).
4. Research method
The controversy surrounding the passage of the ANWR Bill provides the
empirical setting for our study of how frontstage and backstage concepts can be utilized
to better understand sustainability management and disclosure. We first turn to the
qualitative study of the corporate frontstage performance of oil and gas firms in their
sustainability reports, and then quantitatively analyze their backstage performance
through their political strategies, using a political action committee empirical model. The
ultimate purpose of our approach is to compare the frontstage environmental performance
portrayed in corporate reports with the backstage usage of PACs to influence votes for
the passage of the ANWR Bill. We contend that our multi-method approach to this issue
enriches our analysis (Grafton, Lillis and Mahama, 2011) by recognizing that both
discourse and numerical evidence are conveyors of meaning necessary to better
understand a complex phenomenon (Malina, Nørreklit and Selto, 2011). Our qualitative
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findings allow us to draw additional inferences about the broader corporate context of our
PAC analysis (Malina, Nørreklit and Selto, 2011).
Qualitative approach
To be considered in our study, U.S. oil and gas companies needed to have, during
the ANWR Bill debate period, 1) published sustainability reports and 2) made political
contributions. These criteria resulted in focusing our attention on seven large and highly
visible U.S. multinational oil and gas corporations representing approximately 75% of the
market share in the oil and gas industry during that period (see Table 1 for a list of the
seven companies).7  As larger companies both tend to have broader political influence
(see e.g., Scherer and Palazzo, 2011) and are known to publish more sustainability
disclosures (Buhr et al., 2014), we maintain that such a sample provides us with a sound
opportunity to contrast corporate sustainability reporting practices with their political
lobbying activities. We examined the stand-alone sustainability reports8 of the selected
companies to assess how their perspectives on the environment were presented in their
sustainability report narrative disclosures. We were particularly interested in their
position and discourse on biodiversity protection since it constitutes a major issue in the
ANWR context. We collected and examined the available 2003-2005 sustainability
reports because those were published from 2004 to 2006, which corresponds to the period
7 While three other U.S. oil and gas companies made PAC contributions during the study period (Devon, El
Paso and Valero), they did not issue sustainability reports in parallel, which lead to their exclusion of our
analysis. As an indication of the market share, we computed the 3-year average proportion of our sample
firms’ revenues over the overall total revenues of all firms with the same Standard Industrial Classification
(SIC) codes.  Those codes were 1311 (Crude Petroleum and Natural Gas), 1389 (Oil and Gas Field
Services) and 2911 (Petroleum Refining).
8 For the sake of simplicity, we consider under “sustainability reports” any corporate stand-alone report
labelled “Environmental, health and safety report”, “Sustainable development report”, “Social
responsibility report”, “Corporate citizenship report”, “Corporate responsibility report” or any other similar
title.
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during which the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge started to be targeted by the ANWR
Bill. Examining the reports published during this period allows us to draw analyses
between the policies and activities highlighted in the reports on the frontstage and the
corporate political activities and strategies undertaken by the oil and gas industry leaders
on the backstage (Goffman, 1959). In total, 21 reports were collected for seven
corporations.9 Despite being relatively small in absolute numbers, our sample includes all
the sustainability reports published in our study period by the seven U.S. oil companies,
hence allowing us a sufficient basis on which to build our discussion of corporate
activities.  GRI G2 (2002) was in effect at the time these reports were published. Four out
of seven companies do not refer to the GRI in their reports; one company mentions
starting the alignment of its reporting with GRI in its 2004-2005 report; and the two
remaining companies mention that their 2004 and/or 2005 reports are informed by or
mostly consistent with GRI G2.
We use a qualitative content analysis to examine the reports (Bryman and Bell,
2015). We first imported the reports into the Atlas.ti software (Atlas.ti, 2004), which we
mainly used to organize the data and provide a structure to data analysis. Drawing on the
analysis of the ANWR case and the review of corporate documents, the authors generated
the codes to be used in the analysis. After the initial coding of all relevant information, all
codes were reviewed to verify the reliability of the coding. Any inconsistency was
investigated and adjusted if necessary and a final review of all codes was performed to
further ensure coding reliability. Following Langley (1999), a narrative strategy for data
9 Four companies had three sustainability reports available for years ended 2003 to 2005, respectively. In
addition to its sustainability reports, one of these companies had also their Environmental, Health and
Safety (EHS) reports for those three years.  One company had sustainability reports only for years ended
2003 and 2004, another had them only for years ended 2004 and 2005 and a third had a 2003 report and
one combined report for years ended 2004-2005.
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analysis was used to analyze the information content of each code. This first step resulted
in a representation of the type of disclosure included in each coding category. The
analysis then moved onto what Langley (1999) calls a visual mapping strategy, in which
data is organized in a systematic visual format (Miles and Huberman 1994). In this step,
matrices were used to group codes and their associated quotations into main categories
according to common themes (O’Dwyer, 2004). The two major code categories that
emerged from the grouping were corporate environmental commitment and biodiversity
protection. Matrices were then employed to analyze the information from each category
through a within-category analysis method to identify trends and to summarize each main
theme. Categories were then compared using a cross-category approach in order to
identify relations between corporations’ views on the protection of the natural
environment. Moreover, in seeking to provide further insights in regard to the positioning
of corporate political activities on the frontstage-backstage continuum, we also explored
whether corporations provide in the disclosures information about their political position,
contributions and other activities.
Quantitative approach
We examined quantitative evidence related to the lobbying activities of the same
oil and gas companies in order to assess their political strategies. Our examination
consists of two separate empirical analyses. First, we constructed an empirical model that
includes PAC contribution amounts from oil and gas firms received by members of the
109th U.S. Congress House of Representatives (hereafter, “House members”). To explain
political factors associated with their contribution decisions, we focus on House
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Resources Committee members of the 109th Congress because of their close involvement
with natural resources management. We argue that when legislation such as the ANWR
Bill is pending, oil and gas firms will become more active on the political stage by
making significantly higher PAC contributions to a select group of pertinent and
influential legislators (Cho et al., 2008; Roberts et al., 2003; Thornburg and Roberts,
2008) such as House Resources Committee members.
Second, we constructed a voting model that tests whether legislators receiving
significant campaign contributions from the PACs of the seven oil and gas companies
were likely to vote in favor of opening ANWR to allow drilling to take place. A
significant, positive relation between the legislator’s support for the ANWR Bill and the
amount of campaign support received from these oil companies would suggest that the
companies’ political strategies show much more concern for core drilling activities and
much less concern for protecting the environment.
Sample
The unit of analysis for the empirical model is each member of the 109th Congress
U.S. House of Representatives. To be included in the sample, members had to have cast a
vote on the ANWR Bill, and have a 2006 League of Conservation Voters (LCV)10
Congress member voting record score as well as their party affiliation available. Of the
435 members, 9 did not vote on the Bill due to excused or unexcused absences, vacant
seat and ineligibility to vote. As a result, the final sample includes 426 House members.
Measurement of variables
10 The League of Conservation Voters (LCV) publishes annually a report called “How the xxth Congress
voted on Energy and the Environment”. It provides ratings on how each Congressman performed in voting
for legislations related to the environment.  In addition, it provides an objective roll-call vote record of key
environmental legislations.  The 109th Congress voted on numerous issues, which included the ANRW Bill.
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PAC contributions from the U.S. oil and gas industry
Our research interest is in (1) large U.S. oil and gas firms and how much their
political action committees contributed to political campaigns; and (2) whether those
contributions appear to significantly affect the voting behavior of House members. PAC
expenditures made for campaign contributions must be disclosed to the FEC and
information on corporate political spending is available from the Center for Responsive
Politics. This variable is measured by the total hard dollar amount of campaign
contributions made by the seven U.S. oil and gas industry firms to members of the 109th
U.S. House of Representatives during the 2004 and 2006 election cycles.
Membership in the House Resources Committee
As discussed earlier, the House Resources Committee under the 109th U.S.
Congress had jurisdiction over House Bill H.R. 5429. Consequently, we predict that
members of this particular Committee received higher amounts of PAC contributions
than their non-member counterparts. The test variable is a binary variable coded as “yes”
(or “1”) if the Representative is a member of the Resources Committee and “no” (or “0”)
otherwise. We use the Committee rosters in the 109th Congressional Directory to
determine their membership.
Vote on the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Bill (House Bill H.R. 5429)
This binary variable is coded as “1” if the Representative voted for the passage of
ANWR Bill and “0” otherwise.  The voting record (House roll-call vote 209) was
obtained from the U.S. House of Representatives – Office of the Clerk.
Control variables
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We control for other factors that may affect firms’ allocations of PAC
contributions and/or a House member’s voting behavior. Two control variables are
frequently used in PAC contribution models and roll-call voting models – legislator
ideology and political party affiliation (see, e.g., Roberts et al., 2003; Cho et al., 2008). A
legislator’s ultimate goal is to be re-elected; the two most fundamental resources needed
for re-election are votes, which can only be given by constituents living in the legislator’s
home district, and money, which can be provided by a number of sources. In general,
votes and money flow to legislators who supply the legislation that is desired by their
voting constituents and their moneyed interests. Thus, both the legislator’s ideology and
party affiliation are a predictable signal to the political market about the types of
legislation that a legislator will supply in the future (Roberts et al., 2003; Cho et al.,
2008). In this study, legislator ideology is represented by the legislator’s voting record
score computed by the LCV. This score is obtained by dividing the number of pro-
environmental votes by the total number of votes actually cast, ignoring absences. Higher
ratings will thus be pro-environment. The party affiliation control variable is a binary
variable, which is coded as “1” if the House member is affiliated with the Republican
Party and “0” otherwise. These records are available from the 109th Congressional
Directory.
Regression models
We tested whether Resources Committee members of the 109th Congress received
significantly higher amounts of PAC contributions from firms operating in the U.S. oil
and gas industry than their non-member counterparts. We conducted a cross-sectional
regression analysis, controlling for legislator ideology and party affiliation. We included
such control variables because we seek to isolate these effects on campaign contributions
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from our membership test variable. Because PAC contributions, our dependent variable,
cannot be negative, we used Tobit analysis to estimate our regression model (see, e.g.,
Cho et al., 2008; McDonald and Moffitt, 1980; Roberts et al., 2003). The Tobit model is
stated as follows:
OIL_GAS_PAC = a1 + b1COM_RESOURCES + b2PARTY + b3LCV
where:
OIL_GAS_PAC = PAC dollar contributions made by firms in the U.S. oil and gas
   industry to members of the 109th U.S. House of Representatives
   during the 2004 and 2006 election cycles;
COM_RESOURCES = Dummy variable, 1 if the Representative is a member of the
   House Resources Committee under the U.S. 109th Congress, 0
   otherwise;
PARTY = Dummy variable, 1 if the Representative is affiliated with the
   Republican party, 0 otherwise;
LCV = Representative’s environmental voting record score assessed
   by the League of Conservation Voters.
One of the key goals of a PAC is to influence the voting behavior of legislators on
the issue(s) of interest (Roberts et al., 2003). We determine the effectiveness the
campaign contributions made by PACs from firms in the U.S. oil and gas industry by
examining the relation between those PAC dollar amounts and roll-call votes on House
Bill H.R. 5429.  Because of the binary nature of the roll-call vote variable, we used
logistic regression to test the effectiveness of such political strategies.  The logistic model
is stated as:
VOTE = a1 + b1 OIL_GAS_PAC + b2PARTY + b3LCV11
where:
11 A preliminary multiple regression was conducted to calculate Mahalanobis distance (to identify outliers)
and examine multicollinearity among the three predictors. Tolerance for all variables was greater than 0.1,
indicating that multicollinearity is not a problem in this model. There were two cases with a Mahalanobis
distance greater than χ2(3)=16.266 (critical value at p = 0.001). We ran the model both with and without
these outliers and the results were qualitatively the same.
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VOTE = Dummy variable, 1 if the Representative voted for House
   Bill H.R. 5429, 0 otherwise;
OIL_GAS_PAC = Natural log of PAC dollar contributions made by firms in the
   U.S. oil and gas industry to members of the 109th U.S. House of
   Representatives during the 2004 and 2006 election cycles;
PARTY = Dummy variable, 1 if the Representative is affiliated with the
   Republican party, 0 otherwise;
LCV = Representative’s environmental voting record score assessed
   by the League of Conservation Voters.
5. Findings
5.1. Qualitative findings
Our analysis indicates that all corporations used their sustainability reports to
emphasize their concerns for environmental issues and to express their commitment
towards environmental protection. The excerpts from sustainability reports presented
below are examples of typical disclosures made in this respect.
ExxonMobil is committed to operating responsibly everywhere we do
business by implementing scientifically sound, practical solutions to
meet energy needs in an environmentally responsible manner
(ExxonMobil 2005, p. 20, emphases added).
To achieve our goal of HSE [Health, Safety and Environmental]
excellence, we are committed to integrating HSE practices into all of
our business activities by adhering to the following goals: · Creating
incident-free work environments; Conducting business with no adverse
environmental impacts; Demonstrating industry leadership in HSE
performance. (Halliburton, 2003, p.8, emphases added)
Environmental stewardship means more than keeping track of
emissions and waste statistics.  It is a genuine commitment to minimize
the impact our operations have in the communities where we live and
work (Marathon 2004, p. 9, emphases added).
Although different in formulation, all excerpts carry the same message – environmental
protection occupies a significant stance in corporate operations and it drives the manner
in which corporations perform their activities. While the above quotes refer to past or
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present years, corporations also use sustainability reports to emphasize their
environmental commitment for the years to come:
Koch companies worldwide will manage operations in a manner that
protects the environment and the health and safety of employees,
customers, contractors and the public while fully complying with
applicable laws and regulations (Koch 2003, p. 2, emphasis added).
As we move forward, we will continue to seek the most effective
solutions to promote sustainable and environmentally sensitive
development and to enhance our programs in order to help meet local
needs.  We are proud of our accomplishments to date, and we will
continue to operate in a manner that respects human rights, protects the
environment, and generally improves the quality of life for our
employees and our communities around the world (Occidental 2003b,
p. 1, emphases added).
In parallel to these overarching commitments to protect the environment, some
corporations also state their dedication to preserve biodiversity—a central issue in the
ANWR debate. Again, these concerns cover current and future corporate operations:
Chevron works to protect sensitive ecological habitats and species
around our operations by focusing on biodiversity conservation. (…)
Oil and gas operations may affect biodiversity through both direct
impacts (such as physical footprints) and secondary impacts (such as
enabling access to previously inaccessible areas) (Chevron 2004, p. 58,
emphases added).
ExxonMobil recognizes the protection of biodiversity - the variety and
complexity of life - as an important conservation issue that presents
broad challenges to society. We believe we can operate responsibly in
sensitive areas by implementing scientific, practical and sustainable
solutions. Protecting biodiversity is a fundamental part of our
environmental management system and is considered during our
business planning and across all aspects of our operations. (Exxon,
2003, p.10, emphases added)
The above quotes illustrate how corporations recognize the environmental issue
of biodiversity protection as an environmental concern in itself and how they
claim to integrate this issue in their overall environmental approach. Examples
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of initiatives implemented for biodiversity protection are sometimes offered in
complement to specific environmental concerns. These initiatives took place in
different regions of the world, from coastal lines to tropical forests. Exxon, for
instance, details various biodiversity initiatives it implemented or worked on in
partnership with governments and/or other stakeholders. Other initiatives are as
follows:
We are an active participant in energy industry efforts on biodiversity
(…). Key efforts in this regard are encouraging broader industry testing
and use of EBI [Energy and Biodiversity Initiative] tools and
guidelines, and holding workshops in a number of regions to build
relationships with key stakeholders and share best practices on
biodiversity conservation. (Chevron, 2004, p.58, emphasis added)
Biodiversity monitoring does not indicate significant impacts to
mammals, birds, amphibians/reptiles, fish or macro-invertebrates. All
canopy bridges were successfully installed and movement of arboreal
mammals, primarily monkeys, has been observed. This innovative
project received two awards for showing how sustainable development
concepts can be integrated into oil development. (Occidental, 2003a,
p.7, emphases added).
In the context of ANWR, two initiatives are worth mentioning as they took place
in Alaska. First, Marathon (2004) presents its Kenai Gas Field operations in the
Cook Inlet Region of Alaska as a testimony of the firm’s commitment to
minimize its environmental impacts, including biodiversity protection. The firm
explains its commitment by highlighting it “has worked to reduce emissions and
protect wildlife habitats as part of its natural gas operations” (2004, inside cover
page, emphasis added) in the area. Second, ConocoPhillips (2004) recognizes
the sensitive ecosystems present in the Alaska North Slope and states how oil
exploration and development activities need to be pursued while protecting the
environment.
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Altogether, with these disclosures, our case firms portray themselves as aware and
sensitive to the delicate biodiversity issues associated with their worldwide (and Alaskan)
operations. Strictly based on this voluntarily disclosed information, it can be inferred that
these companies are sufficiently sensitive to environmental issues related to the ANWR
context.
Overall, the information on environmental performance provided in stand-alone
sustainability reports emphasizes the care given to environmental protection in corporate
operations. At the frontstage of their environmental management, corporations picture
themselves as responsible companies that not only acknowledge but also deal with their
environmental issues to improve their environmental performance. A tight match
between the corporations’ portrayal and their actions would suggest that their political
strategy would be aligned with their expressed environmental commitment.
Disclosures on political contributions
Before moving on to analyze corporate political activities through their PAC
contributions, we will explore first whether and how political contributions appear on the
frontstage in our setting by examining the information on lobbying activities provided by
the corporations in their own sustainability reports.
Goffman (1959) recognizes that clear-cut frontstage and backstage situations are
not to be expected due to the multiple performances played simultaneously to different
audiences (see also Ross, 2007). He instead suggests that “in a concrete situation, we may
expect a predominance of one style or the other” (p. 129). In the context of our study,
such clear-cut frontstage/backstage performance would be found, for example, if
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backstage political strategies12 related to environmental legislation were not mentioned in
the frontstage sustainability report discourse. Although very limited in number, we find,
however, that three of the seven firms analyzed mention some of their political activities
in their sustainability reports. One firm expresses its consistency between its
environmental commitment and its participation in public policy:
ConocoPhillips engages in public policy discussions through different
means, including membership in trade associations involved in public
policy issues, research, and direct lobbying campaigns on specific
issues. The company’s current public policy areas of emphasis are
energy policy, fuel standards, climate change and clean air issues, and
industry health, environment, safety and social issues (ConocoPhillips
2004, p. 15, emphases added).
In line with the corporation’s publicly reported environmental commitment (see the
previous section), environmental issues appear to be part ConocoPhillips’ public policy
engagement.  However, this consistency still raises questions; both the nature of the
environmental issues and the purpose of the corporation’s political campaign are vaguely
described at best, leaving users wonder what issues the corporation advocates for and
what environmental position it adopts as part of its political strategy.
Similarly, the disclosures of other sampled corporations regarding political
contributions and activities published remain – when present – equally vague. Chevron,
for instance, emphasizes how in making political contributions it both supports
candidates who have a pro-business mindset but also considers their approach on issues
that Chevron perceives to be important. Given that in its sustainability reports the
company emphasizes the importance of environmental issues to the company and the
need to demonstrate “exemplary” environmental performance (Chevron, 2004, p. 6), on
12 We define political strategies as the means used by corporations to influence public policy—these
include but are not limited to including political contributions, PACs and lobbying (see Hillman and Hitt,
1999; Mack, 1997).
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the frontstage it remains unclear how Chevron directs its political contributions.
Similarly, the only thing Exxon mentions about the recipients of its contribution is as
follows:
Designations of PAC funds are made to candidates who favor the
strengthening of the free enterprise system and hold views consistent
with the best interests of ExxonMobil Corporation. (ExxonMobil, 2005,
p. 63).
Akin to Chevron’s, the way ExxonMobil directs its contribution is vague and ambiguous.
According to the GRI G2, companies are expected to disclose a description of
their policies, procedures and compliance mechanisms for managing political lobbying
and contributions (core indicator SO3) and may provide the related amount of money
paid (additional indicator SO5) (GRI, 2002). Two of the three companies reporting
information on their political contributions affirm their reporting is informed by the GRI
(G2). Chevron claims full coverage of both indicators in 2004 and 2005, while Exxon (in
2005) only mentions reporting the indicators, without further reference to coverage level.
Our analysis suggests that both companies are generally compliant with the guidelines for
SO3 and SO5. Undoubtedly, more information could have been provided to further detail
policies, procedures and mechanisms. However, we contend that the most problematic
issue does not lie within the level of compliance with current GRI indicators, but rather
lies within the limitations of the GRI itself.  Our analysis of political contributions
disclosure in light of environmental protection issues exposes the almost complete
absence of links drawn between the two issues – while being generally compliant with
the GRI guidelines of the time. We learn very little about the environmental inclinations
of the political activities and/or about the recipients of the contributions. Thus, our
analysis is yet another example of what the GRI does not show (Moneva et al. 2006;
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Boiral, 2013) and of the absence of integration among social, environmental and
economic issues it produces (Milne and Gray, 2013).
Therefore, we argue that even if some disclosures about political contributions
and activities were made, little information is released about how the contributions relate
to political decision-making on environmental matters. We hence maintain that any
specific information of corporate political activities and contributions remains hidden
from the public eye, and therefore position these in the backstage. We will next seek to
discuss such backstage activities by providing an analysis of the PAC contributions of the
sampled companies.
5.2. Quantitative findings
We first note that out of the total amount of PAC contributions of $3,776,400
made by our seven sample firms, $3,229,350 (85.5%) were given to Republicans and
$547,050 (14.5%) to Democrats. Summary data on PAC contribution amounts given by
each firm is provided in Table 1 Panel A.
During the 2004 and 2006 election cycles,13 there were 228 members affiliated
with the Republican Party, 197 Democrats and one independent. Out of these 426 voting
Representatives, 59 were members of the House Resources Committee, including
leadership Chair and Vice-Chair positions. As discussed above, the ANWR Bill was
passed with 225 (52%) favorable votes versus 201 (48%) against, as a simple majority of
214 votes was required. In terms of PAC dollar contributions received, the mean PAC
dollar contribution amount received by committee members ($13,408) is significantly
13 Members of the U.S. House of Representatives serve two-year terms. Hence, as we focus our analysis on
vote for/against the ANRW Bill in March 2006, we examined membership and PAC contributions data
from 2004 to 2006 within their respective election cycles.
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higher than their non-member counterparts ($8,134) (at the p < .05 level, two-tailed).
Summary data on the members of the 109th Congress House of Representatives is
provided in Table 1 Panel B.
[Insert Table 1 about here]
Because House Bill H.R. 5429 was referred and assigned to the House Committee
on Natural Resources, we investigated the composition of this particular committee
during the 2004 and 2006 election cycles. Among the 59 House Representatives who
were members of this committee during these periods, 27 committee members were
affiliated with the Democratic Party versus 32 Republicans. Twenty-three committee
members voted against the ANWR Bill but 21 of those opponents were Democrats. PAC
dollar contributions received by committee members who voted against the Bill totaled
$28,100 while contributions received by committee members in favor of the ANWR Bill
totaled $763,000. Further, the mean PAC dollar contribution amount received by
committee members in favor of the ANWR Bill ($21,194) is significantly higher than that
of members who voted against it ($1,222) (at the p < .001 level, two-tailed). We present
detailed information and statistics related to the House Resources Committee in Table 2.
[Insert Table 2 about here]
Results of the Tobit regression model testing the relation between PAC
contributions made by firms in the U.S. oil and gas industry and Resources committee
membership during the 2004 and 2006 election cycles are provided in Table 3.
[Insert Table 3 about here]
Resources Committee membership is positively associated to the 2004 and 2006
election cycle PAC contributions made by U.S. oil and gas firms (p < .05, one-tailed).
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That is, those firms contributed significantly more to Representatives who are members
of the Resources Committee than to their non-members counterparts.  The LCV control
variable is also significant with respect to its expected signs (at the p < .01 level, two-
tailed) but the political party control variable is not significant.  The overall model is
significant and the explanatory power is relatively high as illustrated by an adjusted
pseudo R-squared of 0.228.14  Similar to Roberts et al. (2003) and Cho et al. (2008), these
results confirm previous findings that firms strategically allocate PAC contributions to
support political campaigns of federal candidates who hold membership in the
congressional committee(s) of interest.
Logistic regression was also conducted to determine which independent variables
were predictors of the vote favoring the passage of the ANWR Bill.  Regression results
show that the overall model indicates a good fit and is statistically reliable and significant
in distinguishing between a favorable and a non-favorable vote (-2 Log Likelihood =
88.825; Hosmer-Lemeshow Test for Goodness-of-Fit χ2 = 4.982, p = 0.760).  In addition,
the explanatory power of the model is high with a Nagelkerke R-squared of 0.922.15
Regression coefficients are presented in Table 4. Wald statistics indicate that the PAC
contributions made by firms in the U.S. oil and gas industry were positively associated to
the vote favoring the passage of the ANWR Bill (p < .1, one-tailed). As to the control
variables, both coefficients are significant (p < .01 level, one-tailed).
[Insert Table 4 about here]
14 Similar to Cho et al. (2008), the DECOMP based fit measure generated by the Tobit regression model is
taken and labeled as the adjusted pseudo R-squared.
15 This model is a binary logistic regression, thus the Nagelkerke R-squared provides a logistic analogy to
the adjusted R-squared in OLS regression.
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Overall, our results indicate that large U.S. oil and gas firms appear to have
sought to exercise considerable influence on the passage of the ANWR Bill. More
specifically, our findings indicate that these firms made significantly higher PAC
contributions to members of Congress who hold influential positions (i.e., members of
the House Resources Committee) in the passage of environment-related legislation and
allocated significantly higher contribution amounts towards members in favor of the
ANWR Bill. Second, our analysis provides some evidence aligned with the assumption
that PAC contributions from the oil and gas industry had an impact on the roll-call vote
cast by House Representatives in their favor. Hence, their political strategies appear to
have been effective in influencing voting behavior.
6. Discussion and conclusions
Using ANWR to define regions in sustainability management, the purpose of this
paper was to illustrate how Goffman’s frontstage and backstage analogy can be useful to
provide insights into sustainability disclosure. To this end, we contrast the frontstage
sustainability discourse of a sample of large U.S. oil and gas firms to their backstage
corporate political activities in the context of the passage of the Arctic National Wildlife
Refuge Bill (H.R. 5429). Using a qualitative approach, we analyzed the available stand-
alone sustainability report disclosures provided by seven corporations during the 2004-
2006 deliberation period of the ANWR Bill. We also investigated these firms’ corporate
political strategies, notably their activities associated with political action committees,
through quantitative empirical political strategy and effectiveness models.
The frontstage discourse on performance (sustainability reports) and the
backstage actions (political strategies) of oil and gas companies reflect two conflicting
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approaches in regards to ANWR. In front of the audience, corporations enact a
performance of environmental responsibility aimed at managing the impressions of their
stakeholders by forging a specific image of them. Our analysis of sustainability reports
highlights how oil and gas companies put forward their concern for present and future
environmental protection. Commitment to biodiversity protection – including in the
Alaskan region – also is underlined in the reports. The emphasis put on these elements
exemplifies a form of “dramatic realization” in the companies’ on-the-scene
performance. This element of performance is employed by the performers to stress
significant behavioral characteristics they want the audience to notice (Goffman, 1959).
A notable example of dramatic realization is found in the detailed biodiversity initiatives
sometimes included in the reports. The level of details provided by some firms to explain
specific, often small-scaled, initiatives appear to be used to overemphasize and
accentuate the commitment to biodiversity protection.
Aside from these detailed initiatives, we notice that most of the information
conveyed in the sustainability reports is generic, composed of rather uninformative or
even meaningless sentences expressing broad unsubstantiated commitments to
environmental or biodiversity protection, with very few allusions to Alaska and no direct
allusions to ANWR. This is consistent with frontstage behavior. Indeed, Goffman (1959)
highlights that frontstage information is characterized by abstractness and generality.
Such abstractness and generality is meant to allow the audience to more easily associate
the performance with prevailing social standards, norms or expectations, in our case the
protection of a wildlife refuge. Similar findings were observed by Holder-Webb and
Cohen (2012), who expose generic boilerplate corporate codes of ethics issued in
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response to Section 406 of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. A polished and controlled
performance is also characteristic of the frontstage, which could help explain the generic
nature of the information found in the reports and the absence of concrete disclosure
about ANWR. Avoiding ANWR within the sustainability reports is a way to control the
message sent to the audience through front stage performances.
Behind the scene, oil and gas companies step out of their environmentally
responsible character and can safely cease the management of impressions. Specifically,
their alleged concerns for environmental stewardship, and particularly biodiversity
protection, appear to be set aside. Corporations instead concentrate their efforts on
lobbying for drilling for oil and gas within the geographic area declared by government
as a wildlife refuge. This approach represents a typical backstage behavior, where
backstage is “a place, relative to a given performance, where the impression fostered by
the performance is knowingly contradicted as a matter of course” (Goffman, 1959, p.
112).
These findings highlight the necessity for oil and gas firms to conceal some
information (their political activities) to sustain their impression of environmentally
responsible corporations required by social norms (Goffman, 1959). Such concealment
takes the form of secrets. In the present situation, a secret about specific pro-business and
anti-environment lobbying activities would be qualified as “strategic” by Goffman; that
is, a secret “pertain[ing] to intentions and capacities of a team which it conceals from its
audience in order to prevent them from adapting effectively to the state of affairs the
team is planning to bring about” (1959, p. 142). These specific types of lobbying
activities can be envisioned as a strategic secret in that corporations want to hide their
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intention to drill the coastal plain of the refuge to prevent stakeholders from taking
harmful actions such as activism (see Doh and Guay, 2006; Reid and Toffel, 2009) or
challenging their organizational legitimacy (see Dowling and Pfeffer, 1975). One might
even argue that lobbying activities constitute in fact a dark secret, defined as “facts about
a team which it knows and conceals and which are incompatible with the image of self
that the team attempts to maintain before its audience” (Goffman, 1959, p. 141). Indeed,
the self-presentation of environmental stewardship found in the corporate sustainability
reports clearly clashes with the lobbying activities of the oil and gas corporations
targeting a wildlife refuge for drilling.
These findings are of high societal and ethical concern as the current voluntary
and unregulated sustainability reporting scheme allows organizations to project an image
and discourse characterized by significant bias, impression management and deception.
While prior research (e.g., Clarkson et al., 2008; Mallin et al., 2013; Neu et al., 1998;
Patten, 1992) examined the relation between sustainability disclosure and firm social and
environmental performance, our study adds to this body of literature by looking at
proactive lobbying efforts. More specifically, those very efforts and attempts constitute a
carefully designed and proactive strategy, which sharply contrasts with the discourse
contained in corporate sustainability reports. Hence, our usage of Goffman’s frontstage
and backstage regions contributes to the advancement of sustainability accounting
research by identifying and connecting in more depth the complex mechanisms and
multifaceted motivations behind sustainability reporting. Combining our findings with
prior impression management work suggest that sustainability disclosures are not only
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used to conceal poor environmental performance, but also to divert attention away from
economically driven political contributions.
Several implications can be drawn from our study. Our findings underscore the
importance of accessible public records. The availability of PAC records was
instrumental to exposing backstage activities in our empirical setting. Corporate
voluntary reporting appears bound to being self-serving and biased (Boiral, 2016; Cho et
al., 2015; Milne and Gray, 2013), which makes it challenging for any external parties to
evaluate corporate performance and the subsequent impact of these activities on the basis
of corporate disclosures only. In this respect, our study highlights the importance of
maintaining accessible and comprehensible public records, from which stakeholders
could gather further information about corporate activities, thus narrowing the backstage.
Similarly, our findings support prior work highlighting the importance of multiple voices
in sustainability reporting to foster a broader (and hopefully more complete?) portrayal of
corporate activities (Apostol, 2015; Rodrigue 2014; Thomson et al., 2015). This stream of
research underscores the importance of alternative accounts of corporate activities,
published by non-corporate sources, to provide additional views on firms’ social and
environmental performance.
Furthermore, our study also joins previous work in raising concerns regarding
impression management noticed in other mechanisms purportedly designed for
sustainability management, such as mandatory reporting (Chen et al., 2014; Criado-
Jiménez et al., 2008; Luque-Vilchez and Larrinaga, 2016) and governance (Rodrigue et
al., 2013). Accordingly, serious concerns continue about whether leaving sustainability
management practices mostly in the hands of private corporations is in fact a sustainable
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idea from the broader social and ecological perspectives (Milne and Gray, 2013).
Moreover, and given in particular the significance excessive use of fossil fuels has on the
acceleration of climate change and disappearance of biodiversity, we argue that it is
pertinent that scholarly work explores how the vast economic powerhouses of big oil use
their resources in attempts to influence political decision-making on both local and global
levels (see Klein, 2014).
Finally, we argue that drawing on Goffman’s (1959) frontstage-backstage analogy
could provide fruitful insights to other topics related to corporate responsibility
communication, such as the recently much debated issue of corporate taxation and tax
avoidance. For instance, the case study presented by Ylönen and Laine (2015) provides
an illustrating discussion of a situation, in which in the frontstage the case company
emphasized high ethical standards, transparency and accountability in relation to all its
activities, while simultaneously in the backstage it was engaging in aggressive tax
avoidance schemes, which it clearly wished to remain hidden (see also Preuss, 2012).
Like all studies, ours is subject to some limitations and leads to avenues for future
research. We investigate sustainability reporting practices for one single industry in a
restricted time period (2004-2006); hence, the extent to which we can generalize our
results to other cases or time periods cannot be determined. Focusing on the 2004-2006
period of political debate over drilling in ANWR also might narrow the breadth of insight
we could gain from a more extended analysis of ANWR. Our analysis of post-2006
political interest in ANWR shows, however, that the political and corporate will to
engage in extensive efforts to open ANWR to drilling seemed to wane after 2006.
Without having a specific, significant piece of legislation to anchor our empirical analysis
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on political contributions, extending the examination to later time periods would require
too much speculation. Finally, we acknowledge that PAC contributions do not solely
drive or reflect corporate political strategies and activities; while PACs help gain access,
other omitted factors may have influenced the politics and outcome of the ANWR Bill.
Because Goffman’s self-presentation framework takes also into account
interactions with the audience in the management of impressions, a dialogue with
frontstage and backstage stakeholders such as corporate managers/executives,
government officials, federal candidates and possibly NGOs could provide relevant
insights on the possible interactions both between them and within the mechanics of
corporate political strategy processes, and as such offers interesting research
opportunities into the complex web of mechanisms, influences and motivations
underlying sustainability reporting. Further work could for instance draw on Goffman’s
(1959) notion regarding how instead of a single frontstage there might be several
simultaneous stages on which an actor needs to go and perform in a particular social role.
This kind of a situation could well a describe an organization, which may need to perform
in front of several stakeholder groups, say private investors, regulatory inspectors and
environmental NGOs, each of which has a particular set of expectations on the
organization. Although the performance on different frontstages may differ in emphasis,
the actor nonetheless needs to maintain some coherence between them. We thus posit that
Goffman’s framework continues to have potential for further work regarding corporate
sustainability talk and related action.
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Table 1 – Panel A
Data summary
Political action committees of U.S. oil and gas firms
Name PAC ContributionsTotal
PAC Contributions
Democrats
PAC Contributions
Republicans
Chevron $458,950 $60,200 $398,750
ConocoPhilips $371,500 $31,000 $340,500
ExxonMobil $957,500 $58,350 $899,150
Halliburton $212,500 $21,500 $191,000
Koch $1,048,500 $225,000 $823,500
Marathon $207,450 $53,500 $153,950
Occidental $520,000 $97,500 $422,500
Total $3,776,400 $547,050 $3,229,350
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Table 1 – Panel B
Data summary
109th Congress House of Representatives (2004/2006 election cycles)
Data summary on House members and vote
Party affiliation  197 Democrats  228 Republicans 1 Independent
Vote for ANWR Bill 27 198 0
Vote against ANWR Bill 170 30 1
Data summary on House members and Natural Resources Committee
membership
House Committee on Natural
Resources
Committee
members
Committee
non-members
Membership during the 2004 and
2006 election cycles 59 367
Total PAC dollar contributions
received from firms operating in
the U.S. oil and gas industry $791,100  $2,985,300
Mean PAC dollar contributions
received per member from firms
operating in the U.S. oil and gas
industry $13,408 $8,134 (p < .05)*
* Significance level is based on a two-tailed test.
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Table 2
Data summary
109th Congress House Committee on Natural Resources (2004/2006 election cycles)
Panel A
Data summary on House Committee on Natural Resources based on party affiliation
Party affiliation Democratic Republican
Number of members 27 32
   -who voted for ANWR Bill 6 30
   -who voted against ANWR Bill 21 2
Number of members who received PAC
contributions from firms operating in the
U.S. oil and gas industry 13 28
Total PAC dollar contributions received
from firms operating in the U.S. oil and
gas industry $139,600 $651,500
Mean PAC dollar contributions received
per member from firms operating in the
U.S. oil and gas industry $5,170 $20,359 (p = .001)**
LCV voting score 78.30 10.03 (p = .001)**
Panel B
Data summary on House Committee on Natural Resources based on vote
Vote on the ANWR Bill Against For
Number of members 23 36
   -Democrat 21 6
-Republican 2 30
Number of members who received PAC
contributions from firms operating in the
U.S. oil and gas industry 7 34
Total PAC dollar contributions received
from firms operating in the U.S. oil and
gas industry $28,100 $763,000
Mean PAC dollar contributions received
per member from firms operating in the
U.S. oil and gas industry $1,222 $21,194 (p < .001)**
LCV voting score 86.26 12.53 (p < .001)**
** Significance levels are based on two-tailed tests.
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Table 3
Tobit results for tests of pooled cross-sectional relation between PAC contribution
dollars made by firms operating in the U.S. oil and gas industry during the 2004 and
2006 election cycles and the 109th U.S. Congress House Committee on Natural
Resources membership, controlling for party affiliation and LCV environmental
voting rating.  The Tobit regression model is:  OIL_GAS_PAC = a1 +
b1COM_RESOURCES + b2PARTY + b3LCV.
Model explanatory power
Number of observations 426
Pseudo Chi-Square statistic 62.279
Pseudo R-squared 0.228
Parameter estimates
Variable Predictedsign
Parameter
estimate   t-stat
Significance
(p-value)*
COM_RESOURCES (+) 3954.75  1.773 0.038
PARTY (+/-)  -3579.13  -1.207 0.227
LCV (+/-) -386.22 -9.059 0.000
Intercept None  22531.95  6.492 0.000
Dependent variable = OIL_GAS_PAC
* Significance levels are based on a one-tailed test for the COM_RESOURCES variables
and two-tailed for the PARTY and LCV variables.
OIL_GAS_PAC = PAC dollar contributions made by firms in the U.S. oil and gas
   industry to members of the 109th U.S. House of Representatives
   during the 2004 and 2006 election cycles;
COM_RESOURCES = Dummy variable, 1 if the Representative is a member of the
   House Resources Committee under the U.S. 109th Congress, 0
   otherwise;
PARTY = Dummy variable, 1 if the Representative is affiliated with the
   Republican party, 0 otherwise;
LCV = Representative’s environmental voting record score assessed
   by the League of Conservation Voters.
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Table 4
Binary logistic regression results for tests of pooled cross-sectional relation between the
109th Congress House members’ vote on the ANRW Bill (House Bill H.R. 5429) and
PAC contribution dollars made by firms operating in the U.S. oil and gas industry
during the 2004 and 2006 election cycles, controlling for party affiliation and LCV
environmental voting rating.  The binary logistic regression model is:  VOTE = a1 +
b1OIL_GAS_PAC + b2PARTY + b3LCV.
Model explanatory power
Number of observations 426
-2 Log Likelihood 88.825
Hosmer-Lemeshow Chi-squared 4.982
Sig. of Chi-squared statistic 0.760
Nagelkerke R-squared 0.922
Parameter estimates
Variable Predictedsign
Parameter
estimate Wald
Significance
(p-value)* Odds ratio
OIL_GAS_PAC (+) 0.112 2.337 0.063 0.073
PARTY (+/-) 3.783 15.853 0.000 0.950
LCV (+/-) -0.188 48.692 0.000 0.027
Intercept None 10.120 36.615 0.000 1.673
Dependent variable = VOTE
* Significance levels are based on a one-tailed test for the OIL_GAS_PAC variable and two-
tailed for the PARTY and LCV variables.
VOTE = Dummy variable, 1 if the Representative voted for House
   Bill H.R. 5429, 0 otherwise;
OIL_GAS_PAC = Natural log of PAC dollar contributions made by firms in the
   U.S. oil and gas industry to members of the 109th U.S. House of
   Representatives during the 2004 and 2006 election cycles;
PARTY = Dummy variable, 1 if the Representative is affiliated with the
   Republican party, 0 otherwise;
LCV = Representative’s environmental voting record score assessed
   by the League of Conservation Voters.
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Appendix
Timeline for Key Events in the Arctic National Wildlife Refuge Drilling Debate
Timeline for the American-Made Energy and Good Jobs Act (House Bill H.R. 5429 or ANWR Bill)1960 1977
ANWR is declared
federal protected
area under
President
Eisenhower’s
administration.
Drilling in “1002
area” of ANWR
becomes subject to
much debate and
controversy in U.S.
media and politics.
ANWR secured by
the Alaska National
Interest Lands
Conservation Act of
1980 to prevent
drilling activity.
Political activities
advocating
drilling in ANWR
led to H.R. 5429
legislative actions
including voting.
2005-2006
U.S. Congress
rejects several
proposed actions
that contained
ANWR
provisions.
2007-2012
President Obama
asks Congress to
designate ANWR
as wilderness to
prevent drilling
permanently.
March 2005 May 19, 2006 May 25, 2006
House of
Representatives’
bipartisan coalition
manages to remove
drilling language in final
reconciliation bill.
House Bill H.R. 5429,
sponsored by Richard
Combo (House Resources
Committee Chair), is
introduced to the House
of Representatives.
House Bill H.R. 5429 is
passed by a 225-201 vote.
Summer 2006
House of
Representatives’
bipartisan coalition once
again ensures that drilling
language is not included
in budget resolution.
1980  2015-2016
